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Abstract 
The implications of integration with the European Union on the labour markets of Central and 
East European transition economies have been neglected in the literature. We build an Applied 
General Equilibrium Model for Hungary and the Slovak Republic and simulate the integration 
process with specific reference to the labour markets in these economies. The results show 
that the effects of joining the preferential trading arrangement of the EU are context dependent. 
Labour markets in the Slovak Republic are more sensitive to the trade diverting effects of this 
form of integration than those of Hungary. This is especially the case for the utilisation of 
skilled labour and can be justified by the structural differences between the two economies. 
This would imply that Slovakia has a lower potential for building on the existing human capital 
capacities. For Hungary, since the EU is the dominant trading partner, the scope for diversion 
and the resulting structural distortions in the labour market remain limited. 
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I. Introduction 
With the transformation process of the former centrally planned economies (FCPE) and the re-
rationalisation of the economic processes of these economies, the possible form of trade 
relations that the FCPE countries might have with the outside has become an important factor 
in underlying the long-run growth potential of each country. As FCPE, specifically those in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), are generally small economies, the relevance of 
advantageous international trade to their ability to produce a viable economic base built on 
decentralised economic decision making underscores the dilemmas of reorientation and 
reintegration of the trade sectors faced by the policy makers. In this light, trade liberalisation 
became one of the priorities of the transition process in the majority of the FCPE allowing the 
influx of imports from non-FCPE.  
Although strengthening the re-rationalisation of production in FCPE internally, trade 
liberalisation has continuously been an asymmetric process in which the political dimensions 
of consequences of liberalised trade have imposed limits to access to export markets. Having 
generally looked to the West, and specifically to the European Community/European Union 
(EC/EU), the transforming economies began to face the same barriers encountered by 
“Southern” exporters in selling commodities in which they have had a comparative advantage. 
(Rajabiun, 1997) The principle components of the EU/CEE agreements reflect effective patterns 
of market protection with respect to their sensitive industry components and various non-
quantitative restrictions such as content clauses. (Winters, 1992)  
This has given rise to what Brunner (1996) describes as the "dual nature" of former socialist 
economies' trade: "export sales to other Socialist markets resembled in their composition 
those of Western industrialised economies, export sales of socialist markets to the West were 
largely of products with high energy and raw material content." This composition of exports 
implies low levels of value added for Western oriented exports. This evidence is confirmed by 
Rodrik (1994) who finds “no evidence” that higher value added output previously sold by the four 
Central European1 economies to the former Soviet Union have had any success in finding 
markets in the West. 
Brunner elaborates on the possible scenarios of further development during the transition 
period. According to the first scenario, CEE countries could gradually revert to an export 
structure with "high content of cheap, low skilled labour" (Neven, 1994). This would mean that 
the region's generally high-skill labour and heavy capital concentration would be ignored and 
the potential long-run advantage (after some restructuring, investment) could be foregone. This 
transition route would favour sectors which can in the very short run produce easily marketable 
products and services. Such short-run structural distortions might produce irreversible loss of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1 Poland, Hungary, Czech, and Slovak Republics. 
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long-run comparative advantage. Under this scenario, CEE economies would have to 
increasingly price compete with newly emerging Southern market economies in order to 
overcome short-run structural distortions and replace lost aggregate capacities. 
The second scenario would envision the utilisation of existing capacities (physical and human) 
from the very beginning of the transition process and upgrade them with new investment. This 
route could avoid the danger of short-run structural distortions and would be a way of attaining 
a superior long-run equilibrium path.  
Recognition of the existence of multiple equilibria in the development process accentuates the 
importance of policy in general, and trade policy in our case, during the transition period. 
Research in modern economic development theory emphasises the importance of choice of 
action in the determination of a long term growth path. For example, Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1989), Rodrik (1993), and Chin and Grossman (1990) demonstrate the possibility of 
multiple equilibria in different contexts of policy choice.  
Here, the developmental significance of micro-structural changes due to different trade 
arrangements is built on the hypothesis that trade policy choice can place the economy on 
different long-run growth paths. Utilisation of available resources, such as human capital, that 
can lend themselves to the production of higher value added goods, can place the economy on 
a superior growth path. Conversely, the transformation of the production structure in a manner 
conducive to the production of goods with relatively low value added, such as those that 
resemble the FCPE exports to the West, may place the economy on an inferior equilibrium 
path. 
In a similar fashion, accession to a preferential trade arrangement such as that of the EU can 
have distortionary effects. Beyond its static welfare implications due to higher prices, trade 
diversion can lead to dynamic losses and an inferior growth path if there were factor 
substitution associated with the use of less efficient resources. This issue would exacerbate if 
trading arrangements were specified by content requirements. Concurrently, in accordance with 
the First Welfare Theorem the allocation of resources to ‘favoured’ industries can lead to 
production structures less efficient than the non-distortionary solution.  
In light of the consideration of potential multiple equilibria we adopt a static general equilibrium 
framework to capture structural effects of policy which can signal emergent production 
structures. We focus our attention to the structural effects of trade policy choice on the labour 
markets in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. We place the analysis in the context of 
preferential trade integration literature, since joining the trading structures of the European 
Union are the political imperative of the governments of both countries.  
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Section II explains the theoretical grounding of the analysis. In the next two sections, we 
present modelling options and the rationale behind them. In section V we present the model, 
while section VI describes the calibration process and simulations of different scenarios that 
we consider. Section VII provides a summary of the results and institutional base for 
interpreting the results. Section VIII concludes. 
II. Theoretical Motivation 
The area of modern international trade theory that analyses the effects of increased integration 
with a trading partner rises out of Viner’s (1950) work on customs unions. As part of the Theory 
of Second Best, the effects of discriminatory trade liberalisation are categorised into “trade 
creation” and “trade diversion”. Trade creation refers to the aspects of increased economic 
interaction – volume of trade or investment – with other members of a Preferential Trade 
Agreement (PTA), while trade diversion encompasses those of decreased economic interaction 
with non-members. Welfare effects of a PTA in general remain ambiguous and context 
dependent2.  
One strand of the recent developments in the theory of PTAs builds on the basic Vinerian 
categories and forms contextual propositions, pertaining to the prospect of the welfare effects 
of a PTA. Michaely (1998), classifies these propositions to “orthodox” and “revisionist” 
categories and sets a framework for distinguishing between the differing circumstances in 
which each category is applicable. The “orthodox” view applies a cost- benefit analysis of trade 
creation and diversion, while the “revisionist” incorporates broader issues such as the implicit 
transfer of tariff revenue to the trading partner and the resulting worsening of terms-of-trade. 
Although this strand of research has made some progress in clarifying the welfare 
consequences of a PTA for countries with specific characteristics, much of the policy 
implications of the theory continue to be in dispute.  
Another direction of research is related to the political economy of trade literature. Building on 
models of endogenous tariff formation Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Krishna (1996) 
demonstrate that one of the significant motivations for the formation of a PTA is gaining the 
benefits of trade diversion by specific interest groups.  
In this light, the formation of PTAs gains importance beyond the present economic trade-off 
faced by a national economic policy maker between the effects of trade creation and trade 
diversion. If agents tend to seek the formation of parochial arrangements that limit competition 
and induce structural distortions through the political process, what will motivate the states to 
pursue further liberalisation? The phenomenon therefore becomes a central element in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
2 An exception to this ambiguity is the Kemp-Wan theorem (Kemp & Wan, 1976). 
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constitution of the international trading regime: In a dynamic sense, will the emergence of 
PTAs become, “building blocks” or the “stumbling blocks” (Bhagwati, 1991) to the creation of a 
liberal international trading system?  
A part of the answer to this question lies in the micro-structural consequences of different 
trading arrangements. Here we focus our attention on the labour market in Hungary and 
Slovakia. Since labour conditions tend to be an important factor in the formation of political 
support for liberal trade, it is important to consider the effects of economic integration on the 
labour markets. In particular we differentiate between skilled and unskilled labour with reference 
to the two described scenarios of the transition process. We highlight the effects of preferential 
versus multilateral trade arrangements on the relative utilisation of skilled labour, unskilled 
labour, and capital. 
This study adds a perspective to the literature that has paid limited attention to the costs of 
distortionary reallocation pressures caused by policies that favour preferential arrangements. 
Furthermore, labour market costs in the transition economies have been neglected by studies 
that focus on the effects of Eastern Enlargement of the EU on the side of the incumbents. 
Often these studies also assume the dominance of production structures based on the use of 
unskilled labour in the CEE trade towards the EU.3 In other words, this assumption precludes 
the realisation of the development path based on the efficient use of existing physical and 
human capacities. Labour market costs, generally arising from the existence of specificity, will 
be taken into consideration because of their importance in the transition economies. They 
encompass separation costs and excessive destruction accompanied by insufficient creation4.  
III. Survey of the Literature 
General Overview 
Research in the field of international trade in the 1970s was characterised by using neo-
classical trade theory as a traditional framework. Studies maintaining the assumption of 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition typically found the benefits of trade 
liberalisation small, often on the order of 0.0-1.0 percent of GNP. Later, in the 1980s, 
economists started to incorporate scale economies and imperfect competition as important 
determinants of the impact of trade liberalisation processes. This wave integrated industrial 
organisation (IO) and international trade literature. (Cox & Harris, 1985) The type of model 
predominantly used for conducting the analysis was an applied general equilibrium (AGE) 
model that can accommodate different organisational assumptions. (A survey of models is 
provided by Shoven & Whalley, 1985.) 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
3 See for example Keuschnigg & Kohler (1997). 
4 See Caballero and Hammour (1998) for a theoretical treatment of specificity in production factor relations. 
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In general, AGE models can take several forms: single- vs. multi-country models or static vs. 
dynamic models. Each of the categories has its advantages and limitations. One of the major 
determinants of the choice of the type of model is data availability and data compatibility 
across countries and time horizons. The level of data disaggregation also influences the 
precision of the estimates and the implications of the models. (Kehoe & Kehoe, 1994a) 
Studies incorporating AGE models have been aimed at simulating real world integrational 
processes such as European Union/European Community (EU/EC) enlargements (e.g. Spain’s 
integration into the EC) and the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA).5 
Single- vs. Multi-Country AGE Models 
Multi-country models attempt to simulate a policy change taking place simultaneously in 
several countries (e.g. the establishment of a free trade area – FTA). For instance Brown et al. 
(1994) study all the NAFTA member economies (Canada, Mexico, and U.S.) and their 
interaction. The study found that the relative size of the economy matters in determining the 
impact of the FTA: the welfare gains, as percentages of GDP are higher for Mexico than for the 
other two larger economies. One obvious explanation of this phenomenon is that similar 
absolute gains in each country result in smaller percentages of GDP for the larger economies. 
Another explanation is that the United States as a “large and fairly open economy” (Kehoe & 
Kehoe, 1994b, p.20) has limited scope for realising further gains by exploiting increasing 
returns due to larger market size (Kehoe & Kehoe, 1994b). 
Single-country models are frequently used in analysis, since they are less complex and their 
data requirements are less restrictive (e.g. data compatibility across countries). They treat the 
variables of the rest of the world as given, maintaining the small country or the almost small 
country assumption (for definitions see the Model Section below). 
Static vs. Dynamic AGE Models 
Static AGE models have been popular because of their emphasis on sectoral interaction: 
reallocation of resources across sectors of an economy and the identification of winners and 
losers under a policy change. However, static AGE models fail to capture dynamic phenomena 
involving time and uncertainty, e.g. capital flows, growth rates, demographics, etc. Exogenous 
shocks can be incorporated into static AGE models, but the simulation remains ad hoc (Kehoe 
& Kehoe, 1994a). 
When time series of data (including input-output matrices) are available, econometric 
techniques can be used to estimate the parameters of the model. When sufficiently long time 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5 See for example Kehoe & Kehoe (1994b), Cox & Harris (1985), (1991), Dungan and Wilson (1991) and others. 
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series data are not available, the frequently used alternative method is to calibrate the 
parameters.6 
Dynamic AGE models involve first of all accumulation of production factors and impose a 
steady state requirement to endogenise factor supplies. Under these circumstances, the policy 
changes also entail a change in factor endowments (accumulation and reallocation effects). An 
extension of this approach is to explicitly look at the accumulation paths between the two 
steady state equilibria (before and after a policy change) and take into account that 
accumulation requires consumption to be forgone (Keuschnigg and Kohler, 1997). 
Welfare effects are in general modelled using the idea of overlapping generations or assuming a 
representative, infinitely lived household. The overlapping generations framework allows for 
intergenerational distributional considerations and is therefore more suitable for the welfare 
analysis of real world integrational processes.7 
A Further Modification: Sunk Costs Incorporated 
Recent work in the field by Mercenier and Schmitt (1996) has criticised the underlying 
assumptions of the IO approach, namely the assumption of costless capital and labour 
mobility, which tend to overestimate the efficiency and welfare gains from free trade for small 
economies. Previous work suggested the convenience of the use of costless entry/exit 
assumption. Introducing sunk costs into the framework significantly changes the conclusions 
drawn from the analysis. The large efficiency gains predicted by the zero-sunk-cost restriction 
of the Harris (1984) type of model are confronted in this work.  
The incorporation of sunk costs captures some, but by no means all, the reallocation problems 
that arise from the existence of specificity as we explain below. The existence of sunk costs 
can be in general applied to both capital and labour.  
In the case of capital, sunk costs, i.e. unrecoverable fixed costs, can become an exit or entry 
barrier. As an exit barrier, by sunk investment decisions firms commit themselves to stay in the 
market (and signal to potential entrants that they will do so) despite possible below-market-
level returns for their specific assets.  
Sunk expenditure acts as an entry barrier, since it must be born by the new entrants, while the 
incumbents do not incur these costs anymore. When trade liberalisation takes place, operating 
profits of the incumbents are squeezed and this fact makes entry less attractive. The 
incumbents who survive the policy change can tacitly agree to raise prices in order to recover 
some of the forgone rents. In contrast, in the absence of sunk costs producers expand 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
6 For description see the Methodology section below. 
7 See for example Keuschnigg and Kohler (1997). 
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production when integration takes place, since their perceived elasticity of demand increases. 
Accordingly, prices fall and profits become negative. This forces some firms to exit and 
efficiency gains to be realised. (Mercenier and Schmitt, 1996) 
In the context of the labour market, specificity arises from the existence of technological and 
institutional impediments to creation and destruction. For instance, workers acquire skills by 
learning on the job while companies invest in the human capital of their employees. Upon 
separation, a part of the investment on both sides of the productive relationship is lost due to 
the specificity of skills and the inalienability of human capital from the worker. In a world with 
imperfect contracting it implies not only that separation is costly, but also the specificity of 
relations between production factors influences creation and destruction decisions. At the 
macroeconomic level there is insufficient creation of new production units due to the sunk 
nature of investment, while destruction is excessive as long as it does not fulfil its 
reallocational role (Caballero and Hammour, 1998). 
The relevance of the recognition of specificity in the factor markets to the transition process in 
former centrally planned economies is obviously important. The incorporation of sunk costs into 
the analysis of trade liberalisation processes can significantly influence the results, and 
possibly contradict those suggested within a more traditional framework with costless entry 
and exit.  
IV. Modelling Options  
AGE modelling options can be summarised as follows8: 
Product Differentiation Market Structure Trade Specification 
 
No differentiation  
 
 
Differentiation by Country 
(Armington, 1969) 
 
 
Differentiation by Firm 
(Dixit-Stiglitz, 1977) 
 
Perfect Competition or 
Cournot 
 
Perfect Competition or 
Cournot or  
Eastman-Stykolt 
 
 
Cournot 
 
 
Small Country or 
Multicountry 
 
Almost Small Country or  
Multicountry 
 
 
 
Multicountry 
 
   (Kehoe & Kehoe, 1994a) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
8 The table does not exhaust all the possibilities. For instance, Bertrand competition specification can be used 
instead of Cournot, but it is rarely found in AGE models. 
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The concept of product differentiation by country of origin, or the so called Armington 
specification (1969), has been incorporated into AGE models in order to account for observed 
large amounts of intra-industry trade. The intuition behind the concept is that consumers do not 
regard goods in the same industry category produced in different countries as identical. In a 
model with homogenous goods, no cross-hauling would be present. 
According to the Armington specification, "domestic goods are different from foreign goods, 
which allows the prices of domestic goods to vary and gives even the smallest country some 
market power". (Kehoe & Kehoe, 1994a, p. 8) This combination of treating foreign prices and 
incomes as exogenous and modelling domestic and foreign goods as imperfect substitutes is 
the so-called almost small-country assumption.9 
Market structure affects the pricing rules that prevail in a certain market. A competitive market 
structure under which produces are price-takers implies that price equals marginal cost. Non-
competitive behaviour can be modelled in three ways. Using the Cournot competition 
framework, marginal cost equals price multiplied by one minus the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
demand faced by the firm (i.e. price exceeds marginal cost). This formula represents the 
degree of monopoly power according to which marginal cost equals marginal revenue. An 
alternative modelling option is the Eastman-Stykolt or collusive behaviour pricing rule which 
simply assumes that price equals the foreign price multiplied by one plus the domestic tariff. 
The third option is a combination of the first two. Namely the price is a weighted average of the 
Cournot and Eastman-Stykolt prices. 
In modelling labour markets in the neoclassical setting of AGE framework there are significant 
obstacles to capturing wage differentials. One approach is to equalise factor returns across all 
sectors. The second approach is to hold wage differentials constant.10  
Since we believe neither of these assumptions can be justified in a transition economy where 
reallocation takes place in response to relative price changes, we hold factor returns constant 
and look at the implied changes in quantities as measured by factor utilisation. Then we 
decompose the effects with reference to the utilisation of skilled and unskilled labour based on 
their relative intensities across individual sectors.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
9 The small country assumption takes foreign prices and incomes as given (exogenous), while no product 
differentiation is assumed in traditional trade theory. 
10 For modelling trade and labour market behaviour see Thierfelder and Shiells (1997). 
11 The unavailability of compatible disaggregate skilled and unskilled labour data also constraints the explicit 
modelling of these two factors in a production function. 
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V. Model Specification 
For conducting the analysis we use a single-country static AGE model following Kehoe & 
Kehoe (1994a) and Mercenier (1994). We also make several modifications in order to mirror the 
data set more appropriately. For instance, the modifications involve the inclusion of the value-
added tax (VAT), fixed costs, a distinction between "basic" prices of the produces and 
purchasers' price and the corresponding accounting identity. The savings category is adjusted 
for the net change in inventories. 
The model has micro-foundations, in which a representative consumer solves a utility 
maximisation problem and producers maximise profits. Government policy (fiscal) is 
exogenous, i.e. not the result of an optimisation problem. 
There are 7 goods in the economy distinguished by trading product categories using the SITC 
rev. 3 (1-digit) classification (SITC 0 & 1, SITC 2, SITC 3, SITC 5, SITC 6, SITC 7, SITC 8),12 In 
addition we include consumption of services, non-traded goods and services, a government 
consumption good and an investment good (adjusted for change in inventories). Purchases of 
the investment good in the utility function account for savings observed in the data. These 11 
categories all enter directly the utility function. Products are differentiated according to the 
Armington specification in all categories. 
The market structure is assumed to be non-competitive for fuels and related materials (SITC 3) 
and for chemical products (SITC 5). There are n oligopolistic firms in each industry which are 
assumed to be identical. 
The following table summarises the above given model specification: 
Consumption Category Product Differentiation Market Structure 
SITC 0 & 1                           (c1) 
SITC 2                                  (c2) 
SITC 3                                  (c3) 
SITC 5                                  (c4) 
SITC 6                                  (c5) 
SITC 7                                  (c6) 
SITC 8                                  (c7) 
Services                                (c8) 
Non-traded goods (NT)      (c9) 
Government consumption  (c10) 
Investment                          (c11) 
Armington specification 
Armington specification 
Armington specification 
Armington specification 
Armington specification 
Armington specification 
Armington specification 
Armington specification 
None 
None (ass.: NT goods) 
None 
Competitive 
Competitive 
Non-competitive 
Non-competitive 
Competitive 
Competitive 
Competitive  
Competitive 
Competitive 
         - 
         - 
          
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
12 See Appendix for the conversion of NACE and SITC rev. 3 classifications. 
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For the Armington specification we distinguish among imports from the following economic and 
political regions: the CEFTA countries, the European Union, the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
and the rest of the world (ROW). Therefore, the total number of regions inclusive of the 
domestic economy is five. 
Lacking information on the distribution of imports from different regions into final consumption 
and intermediate consumption in individual categories, we use the standard assumption that 
the distribution is identical in proportions to that at the aggregate level. 
The Consumer’s Problem 
Assuming a nested (two level) log-linear utility function, the maximisation problem of the 
representative consumer is given: 
(1a)   max u(c
1
, c
2
, ....c
n
) = å
i=1
12
 q
i
log(c
i
)  
(1b)   where ci = {åj=15 dij cij 
(1-1/s)} s/(s-1)  
where cij is the consumption of good i imported from region j, s is the elasticity of substitution 
and dij is a share parameter; 
subject to  
(2)   å
j=1
12
p
pi
c
i £ (1-t)(wL+rK) + T 
where ppi is purchasers' price of good i, t is the direct tax rate, w and r are the wage rate and 
capital rental rate, L and K are consumer's endowments of labour and capital, and T is transfer 
payment. 
Competitive Market Structure 
We assume that each of the produced goods has a production function which combines 
intermediate inputs in fixed proportions and labour and capital with substitution possibilities 
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form bkal1-a. Here k and l denote 
sectoral factor inputs. The general from of a total production function is  
(3)   yi = min (x1i/a1i, x2i/a2i, ....., xhi/ahi, biki
ail
i
1-ai)  
where xhi is the intermediate input of good h used in the production of good i; ahi is the amount 
of good h required to produce one unit of good i; and ahi, bi and ai are the parameters to be 
calibrated. 
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Assuming no production waste, the production function in (3) implies that  
(4)   yi = xhi/ahi = biki
ail
i
1-ai  
If not every good is used in the production of every other good, the corresponding entry is 
dropped from the production function, rather than adopting complicated conventions about 
dividing by zero. 
Since (3) and (4) contain only either Cobb-Douglas or fixed proportions functions, all elasticities 
of substitution in consumption or production are equal to one or infinity. If additional information 
is available on elasticities of substitution in consumption or production, it can be incorporated 
in the model.  
The producers’ problem is given as follows: 
(5)    min wli + rk i 
subject to (4). 
For the categories with differentiated products the minimisation of costs of intermediate inputs 
also applies. Inputs are nested in this case similarly to final consumption: 
(6)   xi = {åi=1
5
 dij xij (1-1/s)} s/(s-1)  
where s is the elasticity of substitution and dij is a share parameter.  
Non-Competitive Market Structure 
The production function given by equation (3) represents constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition among producers. This mode of analysis dominated research in the 1970s as 
described above. Incorporating increasing returns and imperfect competition implies a 
production function of the following form: 
(7)  y
i = min [x1i/a1i, x2i/a2i, ....., xni/ani, max (biki
ail
i
1-ai - f
i
, 0)] 
Here f is the fixed cost required to operate the firm.  
The producers' problem is given as: 
(8)  max p
bi
 y
i
 - (vi yi+ fi)  where fi = wli
f + rk i
f  and vi = wli + rk i 
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with fi and vi representing fixed and variable costs respectively; and pbi being the basic or 
producer price.  
subject to 
(9)   b
i
k
i
ail
i
1-ai = y
i + fi 
Here the producers' problem is assumed to have a Cournot specification: the choice variable is 
output y.  
Since fixed costs are assumed to consist of fixed labour and capital costs only and all 
intermediate inputs are treated as variable cost, the problem for intermediate inputs remains 
the same as in the case of competitive industries. 
General Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is specified by listing the values of all endogenous variables in the model: the 
price for each produced good pj, a level of consumption for each good cj, a wage rate w, a 
capital rental rate r, a production plan for each of the produced goods (yj, x1j, x2j, .... kj, lj,) 
and a level of government tax receipts T. To be an equilibrium, such a list must satisfy the 
following properties: 
· The consumption vector solves the utility-maximisation problem subject to the budget 
constraint described in equations (1a), (1b) and (2). 
· The production plan (yi, x1i, x2i, .... ki, li) minimises costs or maximises profits subject to 
the technology constraints. 
· Supply equals demand in the market for each produced good, where total demand on the 
right-hand side consists of sectoral domestic consumer demand cid, domestic investment 
demand invi, domestic intermediate demand xhid and foreign import demand fimpdi. 
(10)       y
id
 = c
id
 + invi +åi=1
9
 xhid + fimpdi 
for h, i = 1, 2, ..., 9 since by assumption, government consumption falls under the 
category of non-traded goods and this reduces the total number of production categories 
to nine. 
· On the external accounts: foreign export supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic with 
respect to Slovak import demand due to the small size of the economy, i.e. the rest of the 
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world supplies any amount of goods demanded at fixed world prices. At the same time, 
total foreign import demand is given as the function of the real exchange rate: 
(11)   fimpd=M0 (p
T/pNT )e ,  -µ<e<0 
where M0 denotes base year total exports, p
T represents a price index of traded goods 
weighed by volume and pNT stands for the non-traded goods price. The parameter e is the 
foreign import demand price elasticity. 
· Supply equals demand in each factor market: 
(12)     L = å
i=1
n
 l
i  
(13)    K = å
i=1
n k
i 
Here total factor supplies L and K are net of fixed capital and labour costs which reflects 
the assumption of irreversibility of investment or, in other words, sunk costs. 
· The transfer to the consumer equals total tax receipts (government budget constraint): 
(14) T = t(wL + rK) + åi=110 ti pi yi  
where ti is the net aggregate tax rate on good i. 
· The relationship between the basic/producer price and purchasers' price is given by the 
following identity: 
(15) ppi = pbi (1 + vati + impti + tax/subsidyi + tradmi) 
where vati is the value-added tax rate, impti denotes the ad-valorem tariff rate and tradmi 
stands for trade margins. 
Equation (15) implies that the relationship between domestic and foreign price is as 
follows: 
(16)  pdi = pfi (1+ impti) 
where the subscripts d and f denote domestic and foreign variables respectively. 
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VI. Calibration and Comparative Statics Analysis 
In general, a static AGE model uses the comparative statics methodology: 
1. A model with micro foundations is constructed so that its equilibrium replicates the 
observed data. 
2. The parameters of the model are calibrated using simple functional forms (for the sake of 
simplicity). 
3. The impact of a policy change is simulated by altering the relevant policy parameters and 
calculating the new equilibrium. 
Calibration 
In other words: We solve the model described above and use the first-order conditions (FOCs) 
of the optimisation problems together with the equilibrium conditions to calculate the 
parameters of the model. 
The FOC to the consumer’s problem using the one-level utility function gives the formula for 
calibrating qi: 
(17)    qi = ppi ci / I 
where for simplicity I denotes disposable income and equals to the right hand side of the 
consumer budget constraint in equation (2). The parameters qi, corresponding budget shares, 
sum to one. 
The solution to the nested (two-level) utility maximisation problem yields the following FOC 
from which the share parameter dij is calibrated: 
(18)    dij = ppij /ppi (c ij /ci) 1/s 
where s is the elasticity of substitution and its value is set to equal two13. This assumption 
biases the results by implying a high flexibility in the reorientation of imports and therefore it 
quantitatively underestimates the effects of distortionary policies such as a PTA. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
13 See Appendix for data caveats. 
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Prices for the twelve consumption categories, domestic and foreign prices are calculated using 
the accounting identity given by equation (15) and by having the basic prices benchmarked in 
the initial equilibrium, and therefore, set equal to one. 
On the production side, in competitive industries the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function are calibrated using the FOC of the optimisation problem and by 
benchmarking the wage-rental ratio to equal one in the initial equilibrium: 
(19)   w/r = (1-ai ) ki / ai li  
which reduces to 
(20)   ai = rk i / (rk i + wli) 
Equation (20) states that ai is the share of return to capital in total value added. 
Accordingly, the scale parameter bi is calibrated as follows: 
(21)   bi = yi / ki
ail
i
1-ai  
The CES share parameters for differentiated intermediate inputs are calibrated from the 
following FOC: 
(22)   dij = ppij / ppi (xhij / xhi) 1/s 
For non-competitive industries the calibration procedure differs from that used by Kehoe & 
Kehoe (1994a), since they assume that fixed and variable costs are distinguished in the data 
set. Lacking this information, we calibrate the fixed and variable costs by setting the value of 
the number of firms in non-competitive industries equal to a number that reflects the 
concentration in the industries in question. In the case of homogenous goods the number of 
firms n would coincide with the perceived elasticity of demand for individual firms which are 
assumed to be identical. In the non-competitive industries SITC 3 and SITC 5 with product 
differentiation, on the other hand, the perceived elasticity is less than n which stems from 
augmented market power due to differentiation. 
For the case of Cournot competition with differentiated products variable costs are calibrated as 
follows: 
(23)   vi = [ 1- (n + r did - rn)/n ] ppi  
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where r = 1 - 1/s, r<1, n>1 and did is the Armington share parameter for the domestic region. 
In this case the elasticity of demand is n/(n + rdid - rn) which is less than n as long as the 
above given restrictions for the parameter values are satisfied. 
Reproduction of the Benchmark Equilibria 
In order to account for any potential discrepancies between the original data set and the model, 
we generate a new benchmark equilibrium for both Slovakia and Hungary by using the 
computational model.  
In the case of Slovakia, the computational model produces satisfactory results by accounting 
for the simplifying assumptions of the theoretical model. Among them are no inventories, no 
imports of investment goods and some special events in 1993 – e.g. military imports from 
Russia as a write-down of outstanding Slovak claims which appear only on the imports 
accounts and not in fiscal accounts.  
The computational model accounts for 82 percent of total imports and 93 percent of total value 
added. Although the discrepancies at sectoral level are higher, the model captures sectoral 
interaction well and can serve as a solid basis for conducting the simulation and comparing the 
results to this new benchmark. 
The results are even more satisfactory for the Hungarian economy, since the Hungarian data 
set is informationally richer. 14 The reproduction deviates from the original data set by 2 percent 
in the case of aggregate imports and by 4 percent for total output which corresponds to 
accounting for 95 percent of total value added. The discrepancies at sectoral level remain low 
as well. 
Simulation 
By changing a policy parameter, such as setting import duties with respect to a trading block 
equal to zero, we can simulate the integration of Slovakia and Hungary into the trading 
arrangement. We calculate the new short run equilibrium values by using the parameter values 
obtained earlier and working backward with the demand equations in the above section on 
calibration.  
In order to adjust for the recent protectionist tendencies in Slovakia we adopt a uniform import 
surcharge of 10 percent imposed by the Slovak government since 1993. This is a first 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
14 The Hungarian data set consists of two input-output matrices: one for domestic resources and the second for 
imports. Therefore, in this case we do not need to make additional assumptions regarding the distribution of 
imports in final and intermediate consumption. 
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approximation for the overall level of protection, since it does not account for various 
administrative measures (e.g. import licensing).  
We repeat the basic simulations using different levels of tariff protection varying between 0–
30% with different combinations of trading partners. We adopt this methodology as an 
approximation of effective protection that includes non-tariff measures. Since tariff protection is 
not the sole, or even the primary, form of protection used by EU/EC, the use of approximate 
tariff equivalent measures is necessary in a model of this type. Frankel et al. (1995) estimate 
that the effective level of protectionism within the EC to be around 40 percent. We impose this 
estimate as the upper bound on our simulations given that we keep in mind that subsidies, 
quotas, content clauses and other administrative barriers account for effective protection that is 
not reflected in tariff rates.15 Unfortunately, modern economic analysis lacks the tools to 
quantify the effects of disposable protection measures.16 We are therefore bound to simulate 
plausible levels.  
VII. The Results 
In this section we evaluate the results of different scenarios of trade policy. The options include: 
1. The uniform 10% import surcharge allocation compared to the computational benchmark. 
(Slovakia only) 
2. PTA integration simulation (EU) with the surcharge allocation as base. (Slovakia only) 
3. PTA integration (EU) compared to the computational benchmark, 10, 20 and 30% external 
protection. 
4. Wider PTA integration (EU and CEFTA) compared to the computational  
5. benchmark, 10, 20 and 30% external protection. 
6. Multilateral liberalisation compared to the computational benchmark. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
15 For simplicity, we ignore other factors such as content requirements in the European Agreements that even in 
the absence of accession to the PTA lead to trade diversion. Winters (1992). 
16 As a demonstration, an OECD (1997) study estimates that the producers subsidy equivalent in the agricultural 
sector sums up to 43% for the EU. Of course, this measure does not include other targeted non-tariff barriers in 
this sector. For a preliminary attempt at quantifying such barriers see Anderson and Neary (1998).  
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In each case we look at the welfare implications for consumers, output expansion or 
contraction by sectors, import substitution at aggregate level and the new geographical 
distribution of imports as well as the degree of labour and capital utilisation. 
The change in consumer welfare can be calculated using the equivalent variation measure. By 
definition, the equivalent variation is “the amount of money which would have to be given to the 
consumer when he faces the initial price to make him as well off as he would be facing the new 
price”. (Gravelle & Rees, 1992, p. 118) It states how much income the consumer would need, 
when faced with the original prices, to achieve the same level of utility as in the simulation. In 
the form of a ratio this measure can be expressed as: 
(24)   EV = m(p0, u1) / m(p1, u1) 
where m( ) is the expenditure function, p0 is the original price vector, p1 is the new price vector 
under the simulation and u1 is the level of utility attained under the simulation. Consequently, a 
number greater than one indicates a welfare gain and vice versa. 
Alternatively, the compensating variation measure uses the initial utility level as the base. 
Summary of the Results for Slovakia 
Consumer welfare increases under scenarios (2) and (5) and decreases under the remaining 
scenarios which explicitly account for protectionist measures. Specifically, scenarios (3) and 
(4) demonstrate that joining a PTA does not compensate for the external protection when 
compared to the computational benchmark with the relatively low tariff levels of 1993. 
Total output expands under increased protection and aggregate imports decline. More 
interestingly, the results of scenario (2) suggest that as total output contracts under PTA, 
labour utilisation decreases relatively more than that of capital. This implies that relatively 
labour intensive industries are likely to contract, while the level of output in capital intensive 
industries remains the same.17 The contracting sectors include SITC0&1, SITC5, SITC7, SITC8 
and services. The projected expansion in SITC3 only reflects trade diversion due to the large 
base of fuel imports from the FCP economies. Consequently, the aggregate output level is 
overestimated. 
In terms of labour market considerations the contraction of the above mentioned sectors 
translates into relatively more contraction on the side of skilled labour. This is due to the fact 
that SITC5, SITC7 and services belong to the product categories with high skilled labour 
employment and their weight in total output is also highly significant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
17 This result is confirmed by directly looking at the calibrated alfa coefficients at individual industries. 
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Multilateral liberalisation projects a moderate contraction of aggregate output, while the list of 
contracting industries reduces to SITC0&1, SITC2 and services. Labour and capital utilisation 
remain more balanced in this case. The implications for skilled labour employment are thus 
more favourable under this scenario, since SITC0&1 and SITC2 rank lower in skilled labour 
employment. 
This result is the most robust and significant part of the analysis. In all scenarios, excluding 
multilateral liberalisation, emergence of structural distortions is apparent. Logically, these 
distortions are less acute under scenario (4) with a wider and more diverse PTA.  
The Case of Hungary 
The most remarkable difference between the Slovak and the Hungarian simulation results  
is in relative factor utilisation. The Hungarian simulations do not exhibit the large asymmetry in 
capital and labour utilisation, although labour utilisation remains slightly more sensitive than 
capital in this case as well. 
The simulation results suggest that the least competitive sectors of the economy both with 
respect to the EU and the combined EU-CEFTA block are SITC5, SITC6 and SITC8. The 
losses in terms of factor employment are larger when exposed to CEFTA competition. In this 
case unskilled labour loses relatively more, since only SITC5 is characterised by high skilled 
labour utilisation. 
Trade diversion is likely to become an important factor only at higher levels of external 
protection, since output and factor utilisation first decrease and then rise relative to the 
benchmark along with the rate of external protection. 
In general, the responsiveness of output and imports to the trade policy changes is smaller in 
the case of Hungary. This reflects the fact that the EU is a relatively more significant trading 
partner for Hungary. At sectoral level, the Slovak economy is more concentrated in industries 
with large input requirements of fuels and raw materials from the FCP region. Thus, the scope 
for trade diversion under the PTA is more significant for Slovakia.  
The Results and the Institutional Background 
We can gain further understanding of the underlying determinants of the obtained results by 
investigating the institutional environment of the EU enlargement process. By looking at the 
Europe Agreements several studies have identified an array of non-tariff protectionist measures 
which can provide a rationale for the distortionary effects of joining the EU as implied by our 
model. (See for example Faucompret et al. (1998) or CEPR (1992).) These measures include, 
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for instance, content clauses, antidumping duties and the harmonisation of technical 
standards. 
Content clauses. The abolishment of tariffs and quotas under the Europe Agreements only 
applies to products originating in the Partner Country or in the rest of the Visegrad countries 
participating in the Agreements. This condition implies that the products must be wholly 
manufactured in the Partner Country or must have undergone sufficient working or processing 
in the country reaching the minimum content level of 60 percent.  
Consequently, given that Slovakia has extensive trade links on the input side with the countries 
of the FSU, the minimum content requirement leads to trade diversion as the origins of inputs 
need to be reconfigured to comply with the content requirements. Trade diversion is likely to 
increase the costs of inputs and harm the competitiveness of the products. The fact that the 
Visegrad countries have similar industrial structures does not help alleviate the trade diverting 
effect of content clauses. 
Antidumping measures. In antidumping investigations the calculation of the “normal value” is 
based on the actual prices in the CEEC concerned for the alleged dumping and not on the 
normal value for the goods in an analogue country.  
This means that CEEC companies are forced to export at a minimum price that would preclude 
the imposition of antidumping duties. As most of the antidumping cases against CEECs have 
been in the chemical and steel sectors, the use of this very flexible and targeted protectionist 
tool seems to be correlated with the sectors in which the CEECs are likely to have a 
comparative advantage. (Faucompret et al., 1998) 
Harmonisation of technical standards. The Europe Agreements require the CEECs to commit 
themselves to make their legislation compatible with EU specifications and standards. This 
requirement serves as another loophole in the liberalisation process with respect to the 
CEECs, since it effectively acts like a non-tariff barrier.  
The harmonisation requirement protects the domestic EU market by increasing the costs to 
outside producers and by preventing EU firms from relocating their plants to the countries with 
lower protection levels. This implies an inhibiting effect on FDI flows. 
In summary, the non-tariff protectionist measures embodied in the Europe Agreements are in 
congruence with the modelled levels of effective EU external trade barriers. The discriminatory 
nature of the PTA can lead to trade diversion and distortionary reallocation pressure the extent 
of which is context dependent. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
The computational general equilibrium analysis has shown that protectionism – whether 
uniform or preferential – unambiguously reduces consumer welfare, while the framework of a 
preferential trade agreement creates scope for trade diversion as well. Trade diversion in turn 
can lead to an inferior allocation of resources. Specifically, reallocation and utilisation of the 
existing physical and human capacities are less distortionary under a non-discriminatory trade 
regime. The efficiency losses are augmented in the presence of specificity in factor relations in 
the affected industries. At the macroeconomic level this problem translates into insufficient 
creation due to the specific nature of investment and excessive destruction to the extent that it 
does not fulfil its reallocational role. Thus the costs in terms of labour underutilisation are 
higher than those suggested by a more orthodox theoretical framework. 
In the case of Slovakia the simulation of joining the preferential trading arrangements of the EU 
projects contraction in the relatively labour intensive sectors and overall output decline. Skilled 
labour emerges as a loser under this arrangement. On the other hand, the simulation of a 
multilateral liberalisation indicates only moderate aggregate output contraction confined to the 
agricultural and service sectors and extraction of crude minerals. Indeed, Slovakia is not likely 
to possess a comparative advantage in these industries. The utilisation of labour and capital 
remains high in the rest of the production categories, and thus skilled labour is not adversely 
affected in this case. 
The above given results are consistent with the hypothesis of different short-term reallocational 
tendencies described by Brunner. The sectors projected to expand under the PTA are precisely 
those with low levels of value added such as fuels and crude materials. On the other hand, the 
traditional export sectors contract under the PTA. These include chemicals, machinery and 
transportation equipment, and other manufacturing products. The objective of efficient utilisation 
of existing physical and human capacities is more favourably obtained under a multilateral 
liberalisation process than under accession to a preferential arrangement. These results hold 
despite the assumption of high elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
products and conducting the analysis with a large and well-diversified PTA. Both factors 
introduce a downward bias regarding the distortionary effects of the PTA. 
As the results are context dependent, the analysis has different implications for the Hungarian 
economy to the extent that it is less dependent on the input side on resources from the former 
Soviet Union and the EU is the dominant trading partner. Consequently, the scope for trade 
diversion is lower and so are reallocational pressures. The responsiveness of output, input 
demand and factor utilisation to different trade policy choices is less pronounced. The 
simulation reveals that both the EU and the CEFTA countries are likely to be significant 
competitors for Hungary in chemicals, intermediate manufactured products and other light 
industry manufacturing products. This in turn implies that apart from the chemical industry, 
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unskilled labour is likely to lose relatively more upon accession to the PTA. However, relative 
capital and labour utilisation remain balanced. 
The use of the general equilibrium framework has provided a nuanced picture of the Hungarian 
and the Slovak economies. Although we have focused on the labour markets, especially on the 
asymmetry of the effects of economic integration on skilled and unskilled labour, and the 
relative capital and labour utilisation, the methodology can be applied to a broader set of 
questions. The analysis has shown that the methodolgy can provide useful guidance for policy 
makers when the theoretical predictions themselves are ambiguous and case dependent. 
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Appendix I:  
The Data 
The Slovak Data Set 
The core of the data set necessary for conducting the AGE analysis for Slovakia is given in the 
Supply and Use Tables for the Slovak Republic by Commodities and Industries for the Year 
1993, which is a publication issued by the Slovak Statistical Office. (Code No. 041196, Date of 
Issue: December 1996.)  
The tables contain the following information: 
Classification of economic activities (NACE) 
Classification of production (CPA) 
Supply table 
Use table – intermediate consumption and value added 
Use table – final use 
Transformation of supply table from basic to purchasers' prices 
Balanced supply and use tables and GDP table 
Input coefficients for intermediate consumption and value added 
Distribution coefficient table for intermediate consumption and final use 
The unit of account is one thousand Slovak crowns (Sk) and all the presented tables use the 
same scale. 
Aggregate level data are comprised in the Macroeconomic Indicators of Quarterly National 
Accounts for 1990–95 and Yearly National Accounts for 1985–1992 (Code No. 040296), issued 
in April 1996. The geographical pattern of trade is extracted from the ezosr4#9.exe (1991–94 
data) electronic application prepared by the Slovak Statistical Office. 
The Hungarian Data 
The input-output table for Hungary was compiled by the Hungarian Statistical Office for 1994. 
The format of the table is of type “B”, which separates the imported goods from the total 
domestic resources and accounts for their use in a different matrix. The table uses the NACE 
classification with 21 sectors in total. The unit of account is one million Hungarian forints (Ft). 
Data on skilled and unskilled labour employment, concentration ratios and geographical pattern 
of trade are compiled from the Statistical Yearbook of Hungary for 1994 and 1997, since some 
information has become available only after 1994. 
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Some Data Caveats 
The input-output tables use the NACE classification of economic activities while the 
commodity classification used for foreign trade data is SITC rev. 3, one-digit industries. These 
two classifications overlap in certain categories and a finer disaggregation of NACE categories 
would be needed to make them perfectly compatible. However, such a disaggregation is not 
available.  
Although the original Slovak data are more disaggregate than the Hungarian ones, data from 
several NACE categories are compiled as a single entry in the tables, since the concentration 
of these industries is high and the data would reveal substantial information about individual 
producers in the relevant industries. Also, no information on concentration ratios in individual 
industries is available to the public. (Source: Slovak Statistical Office.) 
Econometric estimates on substitution elasticities between domestic and imported products 
and between imports from different countries are unavailable. Consequently, following Harrison 
et al. (1991, p. 100) we assume that the relevant substitution elasticities are “relatively high” 
and assign them a value of two. 
Appendix II 
Classification Scheme of the SITC rev.3: 
  SITC   0 – Food and live animals 
  SITC   1 – Beverages and tobacco 
  SITC   2 – Crude materials 
  SITC   3 – Fuels and related products 
  SITC   4 – Animal and plant oils, fats and waxes 
  SITC   5 – Chemicals and related products 
  SITC   6 – Intermediate manufactured products 
  SITC   7 – Machinery and transport equipment 
  SITC   8 – Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
  SITC   9 – Other commodities and products of trade 
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APPENDIX III 
Conversion of Commodity Groups between SITC rev. 3 and NACE Classifications 
SITC rev. 3 (2-digit) NACE 
00 Live Animals 
01 Meat and meat preparations 
02 Dairy products and eggs 
03 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 
05 Vegetables and fruits 
06 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and their products 
08 Feeding products for animals 
09 Miscellaneous edible products 
0   Food and live animals  
01 Products of agriculture, hunting, etc. 
02+05 Products of forestry, fish 
15+16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
 
11 Beverages 
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 
1   Beverages and tobacco 
 
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw  
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 
23 Natural rubber (incl. synthetic and reclaimed) 
24 Cork and wood 
25 Pulp and waste paper 
26 Textile fibres and their wastes 
27 Crude fertilisers and crude minerals (excl. coal, 
petroleum) 
28 Metallifeous ores and metal scrap 
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 
2   Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  
14 Other mining and quarrying products 
20 Wood, cork 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 
37 Recovered secondary raw materials 
32 Coal, coks and briquettes 
33  Petroleum, petroleum and related products 
34 Gas, natural and manufacture 
35 Electric current 
3   Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  
10 Coal and lignite, peat 
11+12+13 Crude petroleum, natural gas, uranium, metal 
ores 
 
 
41 Animal oils and fats 
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined 
43 Fats and oils processed, waxes 
4   Animal and plant oils, fats, waxes 
No equivalent 
51 Organic chemicals 
52 Inorganic chemicals 
53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials 
54 Medical and pharmaceutic products 
55 Essential oils, resinoids and perfume materials 
56 Fertilisers 
57 Plastics in primary forms  
58 Plastics in non-primary forms  
59 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 
5   Chemicals and related products  
23+24 Coks, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel, 
chemicals and related products 
25 Rubber and plastic products 
61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s. 
62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excl. furniture) 
64 Paper, paperboard and articles thereof 
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, and products, n.e.s. 
66 Floor coverings, etc. 
67 Iron and steel 
68 Non-ferrous metals 
69 Manufactures of metals 
6   Intermediate manufactured products  
17 Textiles 
19 Leather and leather products 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
27 Basic metals 
28 Fabricated metal products except machinery and 
equipment 
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71 Power generating machinery and equipment 
72 Machinery specialised for particular industries 
73 Metal-processing machinery 
74 General industrial machinery 
75 Office and automatic data processing machines 
76 Telecommunications and sound recording equipment 
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 
78 Road vehicles 
79 Other transportation equipment 
7   Machinery and transportation equipment 
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.s. 
30+31 Office machinery, computers, electrical 
machinery and apparatus, radio, television, 
telecommunication equipment 
32 Radio, television, telecommunication equipment 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 
35 Other transportation equipment 
 
81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary etc. f ixtures, n.e.s 
82 Furniture and parts 
83 Travel goods, handbags and similar containers 
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 
85 Footwear 
87 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments 
88 Photographic apparatus, equipment, optical goods, 
clocks 
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 
8   Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
18 Wearing apparel, furs 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks 
36 Furniture 
 
9   Other commodities and products of trade   
Services 45 Construction work 
51 Wholesale trade (except motor vehicles) 
50+52 Retail trade, repair services 
60 Land transport and transport via pipelines 
61+62+63 Water, air and other transportation services 
64 Post and telecommunication services 
65 Financial intermediation (except insurance and 
pension funding) 
66 In insurance and pension funding services 
71 Rental services of machinery and equipment 
72 Computer and related services 
73 Research and development services 
74 Other business services 
Non-traded goods and services 40 Electrical energy, gas, steam, hot water 
41 Water distribution services 
55 Hotel and restaurant services 
67 Services auxiliary to financial intermediation 
70 Real estate services 
75 Public administration and defence services 
80 Education services 
85 Health and social work services 
90 Sewage and refuse disposal services 
91+92 NGO services, recreational, cultural and sporting 
services 
93 Other services 
95 Private households with employed persons 
 CALIBRATION AND REPRODUCTION OF THE BENCHMARK EQUILIBRIUM - HUNGARY
Exogenous variablesBase Year New Base Year New
Parameters (calibrated or exog.)
World price of imports (wpm)p n VAT tax (rvat)
Elast. of subst. (sigma)2 rho=1-1/sigma 0,5 SITC0+1 (c1) 1,0000 1,0000 SITC0+1 (c1) 0,0146 0,0146
SITC2 (c2) 1,0000 1,0000 SITC2 (c2) 0,0870 0,0870
Fcon 2nd level p.(deltac)CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic SITC3 (c3) 1,0000 1,0000 SITC3 (c3) 0,0077 0,0077
SITC0+1 (c1) 0,0563 0,1897 0,0160 0,2096 0,9574 SITC5 (c4) 1,0000 1,0000 SITC5 (c4) 0,0027 0,0027
SITC2 (c2) 0,0324 0,0443 0,0290 0,0385 0,9973 SITC6 (c5) 1,0000 1,0000 SITC6 (c5) 0,0034 0,0034
SITC3 (c3) 0,0792 0,0676 0,1651 0,0603 0,9789 SITC7 (c6) 1,0000 1,0000 SITC7 (c6) 0,0022 0,0022
SITC5 (c4) 0,1765 0,5200 0,1238 0,3469 0,7502 SITC8 (c7) 1,0000 1,0000 SITC8 (c7) 0,0039 0,0039
SITC6 (c5) 0,1971 0,5187 0,1662 0,2596 0,7727 SERVICES (c8)1,0000 1,0000 SERVICES (c8)0,0137 0,0137
SITC7 (c6) 0,1370 0,6930 0,1747 0,4433 0,5234 (normalised and adjusted for import subsidies)NONTRADED(c9)0,0149 0,0149
SITC8 (c7) 0,0917 0,5256 0,1213 0,3177 0,7744
SERVICES 0,0225 0,0225 0,0225 0,0225 0,9990 Import tariffs (rimpt) Dom. production subsidy (rdoms)
SITC0+1 (c1) 0,1305 0,1305 SITC0+1 (c1) 0,0011 0,0011
Icon 2nd level p.(deltai)CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic SITC2 (c2) 0,2495 0,2495 SITC2 (c2) 0,0008 0,0008
SITC0+1 (c1) 0,0677 0,2281 0,0192 0,2520 0,9378 SITC3 (c3) 0,0342 0,0342 SITC3 (c3) 0,0002 0,0002
SITC2 (c2) 0,1649 0,2253 0,1477 0,1959 0,9284 SITC5 (c4) 0,0665 0,0665 SITC5 (c4) 0,0000 0,0000
SITC3 (c3) 0,2242 0,1914 0,4673 0,1707 0,8159 SITC6 (c5) 0,0688 0,0688 SITC6 (c5) 0,0001 0,0001
SITC5 (c4) 0,1784 0,5255 0,1252 0,3506 0,7440 SITC7 (c6) 0,0295 0,0295 SITC7 (c6) 0,0001 0,0001
SITC6 (c5) 0,2059 0,5419 0,1736 0,2712 0,7485 SITC8 (c7) 0,0696 0,0696 SITC8 (c7) 0,0001 0,0001
SITC7 (c6) 0,1357 0,6863 0,1730 0,4390 0,5365 SERVICES (c8)0,2630 0,2630 SERVICES (c8)0,0004 0,0004
SITC8 (c7) 0,0837 0,4794 0,1106 0,2898 0,8167 NONTRADED(c9)0,0000 0,0000
SERVICES 0,1882 0,1882 0,1882 0,1882 0,9265
Dom. excise tax (rdomt) Trade and transport margins (rtm)
Cons. expend. share (theta) SITC0+1 (c1) 0,0000 0,0000 SITC0+1 (c1) 0,0000 0,0000
c1 0,1212 SITC2 (c2) 0,0000 0,0000 SITC2 (c2) 0,0000 0,0000
c2 0,0004 SITC3 (c3) 0,0000 0,0000 SITC3 (c3) 0,0000 0,0000
c3 0,0289 SITC5 (c4) 0,0000 0,0000 SITC5 (c4) 0,0000 0,0000
c4 0,0337 SITC6 (c5) 0,0000 0,0000 SITC6 (c5) 0,0000 0,0000
c5 0,0030 SITC7 (c6) 0,0000 0,0000 SITC7 (c6) 0,0000 0,0000
c6 0,0315 SITC8 (c7) 0,0000 0,0000 SITC8 (c7) 0,0000 0,0000
c7 0,0418 SERVICES (c8)0,0000 0,0000 SERVICES (c8)0,0000 0,0000
c8 0,1414 NONTRADED(c9)0,0000 0,0000 NONTRADED(c9)0,0000 0,0000
c9 0,2540
c10 0,1250
c11 0,2192 Savings rate (rsav)0,219245 0,219245
1,0000 Govt. cons. rate (rgovc)0,124964 0,124964
Non-competitive ind. firm number (n)
Compet. ind. K share (alfa) # of firms SITC3 4 4
c1 c2 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 # of firms SITC5 13 13
0,5192 0,2348 0,2575 0,3387 0,3411 0,4690 0,4129
Non-competitive ind. Calibration
Compet. ind. scale p. (beta) Costs var (vc) fixed (fc) fixed L(flc) alfanc betanc
c1 c2 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 SITC3 (c3) 0,4012 4.691 0 SITC3 (c3) 0,2956 4,9125
6,5775 3,3057 6,5203 5,1805 4,5618 3,8123 3,0267 SITC5 (c4) 0,1066 161.223 46.228 SITC5 (c4) 0 18,2437
Comp. ind.input coeff.(icoef) Noncomp. ind.input coeff.(icoefnc)
0 c1 c2 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c3 c4
SITC0+1 (c1) 0,4035 0,0217 0,0055 0,0029 0,0210 0,0174 0,0164 SITC0+1 (c1) 0,0043 0,0122 Foreign imp. D price elast. (epsilon)-1,8130
SITC2 (c2) 0,0004 0,0697 0,0004 0,0004 0,0077 0,0017 0,0003 SITC2 (c2) 0,0005 0,0001 Base export 1.100.000
SITC3 (c3) 0,0298 0,0431 0,1136 0,0313 0,0346 0,0370 0,0236 SITC3 (c3) 0,2764 0,2563
SITC5 (c4) 0,0589 0,0530 0,0781 0,0500 0,0650 0,0312 0,0246 SITC5 (c4) 0,1231 0,3294
SITC6 (c5) 0,0146 0,0127 0,2740 0,0937 0,0143 0,0184 0,0079 SITC6 (c5) 0,0242 0,0199
SITC7 (c6) 0,0186 0,0275 0,0363 0,2400 0,0168 0,0307 0,0197 SITC7 (c6) 0,0451 0,0281
SITC8 (c7) 0,0214 0,0197 0,0108 0,0184 0,2194 0,0216 0,0347 SITC8 (c7) 0,0154 0,0407
SERVICES (c8)0,0970 0,1136 0,1322 0,1052 0,1197 0,1854 0,0946 SERVICES (c8)0,0667 0,1078
NONTRADED (c9)0,0297 0,0475 0,0479 0,0583 0,0544 0,1062 0,1093 NONTRADED (c9)0,0426 0,0545
 
 Endogenous variables Equations
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base Base Year New
SITC0+1 498.555 499.179 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0253 1,0243 1,00 Utility 5,7713 5,7715
SITC2 1.546 1.547 1,00 SITC2 1,0889 1,0887 1,00 Hous exp. (E)4.218.108 4.219.348
SITC3 120.623 120.667 1,00 SITC3 1,0093 1,0092 1,00 Income (M) 4.218.108 4.219.348
SITC5 137.773 137.955 1,00 SITC5 1,0307 1,0297 1,00
SITC6 12.391 12.407 1,00 SITC6 1,0301 1,0290 1,00
SITC7 129.899 129.956 1,00 SITC7 1,0234 1,0233 1,00 Constraints on nested utility
SITC8 171.033 171.272 1,00 SITC8 1,0308 1,0296 1,00 SITC0+1 498.189 499.179 1,00
Services 587.773 588.023 1,00 Services 1,0146 1,0144 1,00 SITC2 1.546 1.547 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.532 1.055.826 1,00 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 SITC3 120.657 120.667 1,00
Gov't cons  519.380 519.525 1,00 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00 SITC5 137.678 137.955 1,00
Savings(K) 924.801 925.073 1,00 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00 SITC6 12.381 12.407 1,00
SITC7 129.912 129.956 1,00
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod. SITC8 170.910 171.272 1,00
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic Services 587.923 588.023 1,00
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,05 0,91 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92
SITC2 0,02 0,04 0,02 0,03 0,90 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,18 0,02 0,73 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 Total value added 3.728.423 Trade Balance 
SITC5 0,03 0,27 0,02 0,12 0,57 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 Remittances 0 -274.262
SITC6 0,04 0,28 0,03 0,07 0,58 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 Tax transfers 207.816
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,29 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 Short-term external debt 283.109 Labor Employment
SITC8 0,01 0,24 0,01 0,09 0,66 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 -99.506
Services 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,93 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 Total Income 4.219.348
Capital Utilization
Export sharesExports Imports (new)Imports (base)New/base -91.504
NT price (pNT)1,0149 1,0149 1,00 SITC0&1 0,23 246.974 93.597 95.937 0,98
T pr. Index (pTi)1,0101 1,0209 1,01 SITC2 0,01 9.099 927 928 1,00
Real exch. r (rer)1,0047 0,9941 0,99 SITC3 0,02 23.891 164.826 152.102 1,08
SITC5 0,16 174.676 270.455 246.970 1,10
Total Imp. (timp)1.339.837 1.362.497 1,02 SITC6 0,10 113.674 94.659 99.033 0,96
Total Exp.(texp)1.109.402 1.088.236 0,98 SITC7 0,21 226.720 304.374 498.061 1,00
SITC8 0,10 111.430 151.325 153.246 0,99
SERVICES 0,13 142.598 84.640 93.559 0,90
Final import demand Final demandTotal Imports
New CEFTA EU FCP ROW domestic (fcimpn) Output (Yn)L dem (ln) K dem (kn) Output dem. (Ydn)Output (base)New/Base 
SITC0+1 1.266 14.373 102 17.543 465.400 33.283 SITC0+1 1.321.354 193.026 208.457 1.321.354 1.348.047 0,98
SITC2 1 2 1 2 1.541 5 SITC2 23.667 9.449 2.899 23.667 23.508 1,01
SITC3 710 517 3.086 412 115.937 4.725 SITC3 498.538 132.413 55.574 498.538 479.773 1,04
SITC5 3.986 34.595 1.962 15.395 81.878 55.939 SITC5 569.714 40.065 0 569.714 543.346 1,05
SITC6 444 3.075 316 770 7.789 4.605 SITC6 269.515 54.293 18.825 269.515 272.096 0,99
SITC7 2.401 61.393 3.902 25.123 37.116 92.819 SITC7 488.111 118.184 60.537 488.111 501.059 0,97
SITC8 1.326 43.520 2.317 15.902 108.026 63.065 SITC8 438.311 120.274 62.273 438.311 434.043 1,01
Services 188 188 188 188 587.223 750 Services 1.936.280 538.311 475.551 1.936.280 2.261.672 0,86
Total ######## ######## Nontraded 2.262.422 864.375 608.004 2.262.422 2.247.502 1,01
Total Supply 7.807.912 2.070.390 1.492.120 7.807.912 8.111.046 0,96
Interm. import demand (ariimpdn) Interm. demandTotal ImportsIntermediate demand
New CEFTA EU FCP ROW domestic (artiimpn) New SITC0+1 SITC2 SITC3 SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 SERVICE NT Tot. int. dem.
SITC0+1 2.293 26.045 184 31.791 559.551 60.313 SITC0+1 533.123 514 2.136 6.947 1.484 1.426 9.203 33.701 36.994 625.528
SITC2 181 339 145 256 8.675 921 SITC2 478 1.649 245 72 115 206 3.364 3.225 696 10.049
SITC3 24.060 17.535 104.554 13.952 340.574 160.101 SITC3 39.340 1.020 137.773 145.999 30.619 15.293 15.168 71.675 53.423 510.309
SITC5 15.286 132.668 7.525 59.037 302.330 214.517 SITC5 77.827 1.255 61.354 187.666 21.048 24.414 28.480 60.327 55.611 517.981
SITC6 8.684 60.132 6.173 15.065 130.966 90.054 SITC6 19.266 301 12.061 11.338 73.841 45.730 6.288 35.666 17.828 222.318
SITC7 5.472 139.929 8.894 57.261 90.615 211.556 SITC7 24.585 650 22.462 15.995 9.787 117.151 7.367 59.513 44.466 301.976
SITC8 1.856 60.907 3.243 22.255 202.082 88.259 SITC8 28.336 465 7.665 23.174 2.915 9.005 96.183 41.878 78.472 288.094
Services 20.972 20.972 20.972 20.972 805.818 83.890 Services 128.201 2.689 33.229 61.435 35.628 51.364 52.480 359.046 214.088 938.159
Nontraded 39.185 1.125 21.244 31.036 12.911 28.452 23.863 205.557 247.364 610.737
Total 890.340 9.668 298.168 483.661 188.347 293.041 242.395 870.589 748.942 4.025.152  
 EU INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 497.615 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0205 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.537 0,99 SITC2 1,0887 1,0884 1,00
SITC3 120.667 119.859 0,99 SITC3 1,0092 1,0091 1,00
SITC5 137.955 139.316 1,01 SITC5 1,0297 1,0127 0,98
SITC6 12.407 12.533 1,01 SITC6 1,0290 1,0117 0,98
SITC7 129.956 130.875 1,01 SITC7 1,0233 1,0092 0,99
SITC8 171.272 173.125 1,01 SITC8 1,0296 1,0116 0,98
Services 588.023 584.049 0,99 Services 1,0144 1,0144 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.048.604 0,99 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 515.972 0,99 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 918.745 0,99 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7695 1,0022 gain
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0142 0,99 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.190.488 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 1,0007 1,01 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.190.488 1,0023 gain
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.407.882 1,03 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.699.563
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.101.449 1,01 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.310.132 0,99
SITC2 23.667 23.622 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.190.488
SITC3 498.538 492.839 0,99
SITC5 569.714 555.360 0,97 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 264.643 0,98 -274.262 -306.434 1,12 SITC0&1 93.597 103.188 1,10
SITC7 488.111 484.548 0,99 SITC2 927 1.086 1,17
SITC8 438.311 427.076 0,97 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 163.644 0,99
Services 1.936.280 1.923.333 0,99 -99.506 -116.923 1,18 SITC5 270.455 280.808 1,04
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.249.475 0,99 SITC6 94.659 99.025 1,05
7.807.912 7.731.026 0,99 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 306.441 1,01
-91.504 -102.947 1,13 SITC8 151.325 159.897 1,06
SERVICES 84.640 96.098 1,14
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,91
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,90
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,03 0,28 0,01 0,11 0,57
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,04 0,30 0,03 0,07 0,57
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,02 0,48 0,03 0,19 0,29
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,01 0,25 0,01 0,08 0,65
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,93
 
 EU INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY (10%)
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 498.655 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0230 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.544 1,00 SITC2 1,0887 1,0885 1,00
SITC3 120.667 120.077 1,00 SITC3 1,0092 1,0118 1,00
SITC5 137.955 138.386 1,00 SITC5 1,0297 1,0241 0,99
SITC6 12.407 12.479 1,01 SITC6 1,0290 1,0206 0,99
SITC7 129.956 128.984 0,99 SITC7 1,0233 1,0286 1,01
SITC8 171.272 172.499 1,01 SITC8 1,0296 1,0199 0,99
Services 588.023 586.662 1,00 Services 1,0144 1,0144 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.053.343 1,00 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 518.303 1,00 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 922.897 1,00 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7708 1,0005 gain
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0194 1,00 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.209.427 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 0,9956 1,00 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.209.427 1,0005 gain
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.349.786 0,99 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.718.502
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.091.218 1,00 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.316.801 1,00
SITC2 23.667 23.621 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.209.427
SITC3 498.538 498.935 1,00
SITC5 569.714 564.680 0,99 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 267.007 0,99 -274.262 -258.568 0,94 SITC0&1 93.597 95.959 1,03
SITC7 488.111 488.857 1,00 SITC2 927 1.015 1,10
SITC8 438.311 432.187 0,99 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 141.633 0,86
Services 1.936.280 1.931.463 1,00 -99.506 -105.412 1,06 SITC5 270.455 272.517 1,01
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.257.955 1,00 SITC6 94.659 96.506 1,02
7.807.912 7.781.506 1,00 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 301.083 0,99
-91.504 -95.521 1,04 SITC8 151.325 155.532 1,03
SERVICES 84.640 87.844 1,04
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,91
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,91
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,03 0,03 0,15 0,02 0,76
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,02 0,29 0,01 0,09 0,58
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,03 0,30 0,02 0,06 0,58
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,02 0,50 0,02 0,16 0,30
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,01 0,25 0,01 0,07 0,66
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,94
 
 EU INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY (20%)
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 499.479 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0247 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.549 1,00 SITC2 1,0887 1,0886 1,00
SITC3 120.667 120.254 1,00 SITC3 1,0092 1,0137 1,00
SITC5 137.955 137.742 1,00 SITC5 1,0297 1,0323 1,00
SITC6 12.407 12.443 1,00 SITC6 1,0290 1,0270 1,00
SITC7 129.956 127.632 0,98 SITC7 1,0233 1,0430 1,02
SITC8 171.272 172.085 1,00 SITC8 1,0296 1,0258 1,00
Services 588.023 588.608 1,00 Services 1,0144 1,0144 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.056.872 1,00 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 520.039 1,00 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 925.989 1,00 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7717 0,9993 loss
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0232 1,00 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.223.526 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 0,9919 1,00 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.223.526 0,9993 loss
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.301.332 0,96 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.732.601
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.083.939 1,00 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.321.667 1,00
SITC2 23.667 23.623 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.223.526
SITC3 498.538 503.388 1,01
SITC5 569.714 571.635 1,00 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 268.775 1,00 -274.262 -217.393 0,79 SITC0&1 93.597 90.130 0,96
SITC7 488.111 492.206 1,01 SITC2 927 957 1,03
SITC8 438.311 435.944 0,99 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 124.127 0,75
Services 1.936.280 1.937.560 1,00 -99.506 -96.840 0,97 SITC5 270.455 265.208 0,98
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.264.274 1,00 SITC6 94.659 94.301 1,00
7.807.912 7.819.072 1,00 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 295.982 0,97
-91.504 -89.993 0,98 SITC8 151.325 151.832 1,00
SERVICES 84.640 81.100 0,96
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,03 0,92
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,91
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,03 0,03 0,13 0,02 0,79
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,02 0,29 0,01 0,08 0,59
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,03 0,31 0,02 0,05 0,59
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,01 0,52 0,02 0,14 0,31
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,00 0,26 0,01 0,06 0,67
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,95  
 EU INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY (30%)
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 500.113 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0259 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.552 1,00 SITC2 1,0887 1,0886 1,00
SITC3 120.667 120.393 1,00 SITC3 1,0092 1,0150 1,01
SITC5 137.955 137.291 1,00 SITC5 1,0297 1,0382 1,01
SITC6 12.407 12.418 1,00 SITC6 1,0290 1,0316 1,00
SITC7 129.956 126.657 0,97 SITC7 1,0233 1,0536 1,03
SITC8 171.272 171.805 1,00 SITC8 1,0296 1,0300 1,00
Services 588.023 590.039 1,00 Services 1,0144 1,0145 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.059.466 1,00 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 521.316 1,00 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 928.261 1,00 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7724 0,9984 loss
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0259 1,00 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.233.892 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 0,9893 1,00 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.233.892 0,9984 loss
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.260.474 0,93 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.742.967
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.078.739 0,99 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.325.172 1,00
SITC2 23.667 23.625 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.233.892
SITC3 498.538 506.619 1,02
SITC5 569.714 576.770 1,01 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 270.079 1,00 -274.262 -181.735 0,66 SITC0&1 93.597 85.365 0,91
SITC7 488.111 494.760 1,01 SITC2 927 908 0,98
SITC8 438.311 438.679 1,00 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 110.011 0,67
Services 1.936.280 1.942.062 1,00 -99.506 -90.536 0,91 SITC5 270.455 258.760 0,96
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.268.924 1,00 SITC6 94.659 92.364 0,98
7.807.912 7.846.690 1,00 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 291.186 0,96
-91.504 -85.931 0,94 SITC8 151.325 148.664 0,98
SERVICES 84.640 75.521 0,89
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,03 0,92
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,92
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,03 0,03 0,12 0,02 0,81
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,02 0,30 0,01 0,07 0,60
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,02 0,31 0,02 0,04 0,60
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,01 0,53 0,02 0,12 0,32
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,00 0,26 0,01 0,05 0,68
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,95  
 EU AND CEFTA INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY (10%)
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 498.291 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0225 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.542 1,00 SITC2 1,0887 1,0883 1,00
SITC3 120.667 120.009 0,99 SITC3 1,0092 1,0111 1,00
SITC5 137.955 138.778 1,01 SITC5 1,0297 1,0199 0,99
SITC6 12.407 12.527 1,01 SITC6 1,0290 1,0155 0,99
SITC7 129.956 129.092 0,99 SITC7 1,0233 1,0265 1,00
SITC8 171.272 172.477 1,01 SITC8 1,0296 1,0188 0,99
Services 588.023 586.003 1,00 Services 1,0144 1,0143 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.052.057 1,00 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 517.671 1,00 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 921.770 1,00 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7704 1,0009 gain
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0181 1,00 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.204.286 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 0,9969 1,00 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.204.286 1,0009 gain
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.376.542 1,01 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.713.361
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.093.735 1,01 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.315.285 1,00
SITC2 23.667 23.619 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.204.286
SITC3 498.538 497.094 1,00
SITC5 569.714 561.219 0,99 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 265.537 0,99 -274.262 -282.807 1,03 SITC0&1 93.597 97.276 1,04
SITC7 488.111 488.320 1,00 SITC2 927 1.130 1,22
SITC8 438.311 431.375 0,98 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 146.793 0,89
Services 1.936.280 1.928.927 1,00 -99.506 -108.566 1,09 SITC5 270.455 275.391 1,02
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.255.590 1,00 SITC6 94.659 97.981 1,04
7.807.912 7.766.966 0,99 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 301.359 0,99
-91.504 -97.507 1,07 SITC8 151.325 155.966 1,03
SERVICES 84.640 102.951 1,22
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,91
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,90
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,04 0,03 0,15 0,02 0,76
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,03 0,29 0,01 0,09 0,58
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,04 0,30 0,02 0,06 0,58
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,02 0,50 0,02 0,16 0,30
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,01 0,25 0,01 0,07 0,66
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,93  
 EU AND CEFTA INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY 
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 497.481 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0202 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.536 0,99 SITC2 1,0887 1,0882 1,00
SITC3 120.667 119.812 0,99 SITC3 1,0092 1,0089 1,00
SITC5 137.955 139.494 1,01 SITC5 1,0297 1,0108 0,98
SITC6 12.407 12.556 1,01 SITC6 1,0290 1,0093 0,98
SITC7 129.956 130.867 1,01 SITC7 1,0233 1,0086 0,99
SITC8 171.272 173.113 1,01 SITC8 1,0296 1,0111 0,98
Services 588.023 583.750 0,99 Services 1,0144 1,0143 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.047.981 0,99 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 515.665 0,99 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 918.199 0,99 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7694 1,0024 gain
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0136 0,99 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.187.996 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 1,0013 1,01 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.187.996 1,0024 gain
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.424.310 1,05 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.697.071
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.102.593 1,01 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.309.167 0,99
SITC2 23.667 23.619 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.187.996
SITC3 498.538 492.092 0,99
SITC5 569.714 553.808 0,97 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 263.963 0,98 -274.262 -321.718 1,17 SITC0&1 93.597 104.021 1,11
SITC7 488.111 484.390 0,99 SITC2 927 1.177 1,27
SITC8 438.311 426.690 0,97 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 165.004 1,00
Services 1.936.280 1.922.020 0,99 -99.506 -118.429 1,19 SITC5 270.455 281.999 1,04
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.248.334 0,99 SITC6 94.659 99.663 1,05
7.807.912 7.724.082 0,99 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 306.403 1,01
-91.504 -103.934 1,14 SITC8 151.325 160.079 1,06
SERVICES 84.640 108.269 1,28
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,91
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,90
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,03 0,28 0,01 0,11 0,56
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,04 0,30 0,03 0,06 0,57
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,02 0,48 0,03 0,19 0,29
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,01 0,25 0,01 0,08 0,65
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,93  
 EU AND CEFTA INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY (20%)
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 498.926 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0241 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.546 1,00 SITC2 1,0887 1,0883 1,00
SITC3 120.667 120.165 1,00 SITC3 1,0092 1,0127 1,00
SITC5 137.955 138.286 1,00 SITC5 1,0297 1,0265 1,00
SITC6 12.407 12.508 1,01 SITC6 1,0290 1,0199 0,99
SITC7 129.956 127.826 0,98 SITC7 1,0233 1,0396 1,02
SITC8 171.272 172.049 1,00 SITC8 1,0296 1,0242 0,99
Services 588.023 587.662 1,00 Services 1,0144 1,0143 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.055.059 1,00 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 519.147 1,00 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 924.400 1,00 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7711 0,9998 loss
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0213 1,00 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.216.280 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 0,9937 1,00 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.216.280 0,9998 loss
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.336.758 0,98 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.725.355
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.087.460 1,00 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.319.711 1,00
SITC2 23.667 23.621 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.216.280
SITC3 498.538 500.711 1,00
SITC5 569.714 566.668 0,99 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 266.695 0,99 -274.262 -249.298 0,91 SITC0&1 93.597 91.842 0,98
SITC7 488.111 491.333 1,01 SITC2 927 1.092 1,18
SITC8 438.311 434.790 0,99 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 132.369 0,80
Services 1.936.280 1.934.044 1,00 -99.506 -101.303 1,02 SITC5 270.455 269.586 1,00
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.260.936 1,00 SITC6 94.659 96.509 1,02
7.807.912 7.798.510 1,00 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 296.580 0,97
-91.504 -92.775 1,01 SITC8 151.325 152.488 1,01
SERVICES 84.640 98.596 1,16
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,03 0,92
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,90
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,05 0,03 0,13 0,02 0,78
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,03 0,29 0,01 0,08 0,59
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,04 0,30 0,02 0,05 0,58
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,02 0,51 0,02 0,14 0,31
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,01 0,26 0,01 0,06 0,67
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,93  
 EU AND CEFTA INTEGRATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY (30%)
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 499.410 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0252 1,00
SITC2 1.547 1.549 1,00 SITC2 1,0887 1,0884 1,00
SITC3 120.667 120.285 1,00 SITC3 1,0092 1,0138 1,00
SITC5 137.955 137.944 1,00 SITC5 1,0297 1,0312 1,00
SITC6 12.407 12.496 1,01 SITC6 1,0290 1,0231 0,99
SITC7 129.956 126.915 0,98 SITC7 1,0233 1,0492 1,03
SITC8 171.272 171.756 1,00 SITC8 1,0296 1,0281 1,00
Services 588.023 588.871 1,00 Services 1,0144 1,0143 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.057.245 1,00 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 520.223 1,00 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 926.316 1,00 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7717 0,9990 loss
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0237 1,00 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.225.019 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 0,9914 1,00 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.225.019 0,9990 loss
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.303.228 0,96 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.734.094
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.082.996 1,00 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.322.877 1,00
SITC2 23.667 23.623 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.225.019
SITC3 498.538 503.311 1,01
SITC5 569.714 570.639 1,00 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 267.539 0,99 -274.262 -220.232 0,80 SITC0&1 93.597 87.404 0,93
SITC7 488.111 493.608 1,01 SITC2 927 1.059 1,14
SITC8 438.311 437.262 1,00 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 120.772 0,73
Services 1.936.280 1.937.786 1,00 -99.506 -96.010 0,96 SITC5 270.455 264.477 0,98
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.264.833 1,00 SITC6 94.659 95.213 1,01
7.807.912 7.821.477 1,00 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 292.106 0,96
-91.504 -89.330 0,98 SITC8 151.325 149.518 0,99
SERVICES 84.640 94.984 1,12
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,05 0,00 0,03 0,92
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,02 0,91
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,05 0,03 0,11 0,02 0,79
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,03 0,29 0,01 0,07 0,59
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,04 0,31 0,02 0,04 0,59
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,02 0,52 0,02 0,12 0,31
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,01 0,26 0,01 0,05 0,67
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,94  
 MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION COMPARED TO THE COMPUTATIONAL BENCHMARK - HUNGARY
Final Consumption - real (rhouscons)
Base Year New New/Base pifcb/pifcn Base Year New New/Base
SITC0+1 499.179 497.562 1,00 SITC0+1 1,0243 1,0156 0,99
SITC2 1.547 1.530 0,99 SITC2 1,0887 1,0878 1,00
SITC3 120.667 119.409 0,99 SITC3 1,0092 1,0079 1,00
SITC5 137.955 140.006 1,01 SITC5 1,0297 1,0027 0,97
SITC6 12.407 12.574 1,01 SITC6 1,0290 1,0035 0,98
SITC7 129.956 131.131 1,01 SITC7 1,0233 1,0022 0,98
SITC8 171.272 173.588 1,01 SITC8 1,0296 1,0040 0,98
Services 588.023 581.316 0,99 Services 1,0144 1,0141 1,00
Nontraded 1.055.826 1.043.438 0,99 Nontraded 1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Gov't cons  519.525 513.429 0,99 Gov't cons  1,0149 1,0149 1,00
Savings(K) 925.073 914.218 0,99 Savings(K) 1,0000 1,0000 1,00
Compensating variation:
NT price (pNT) 1,0149 1,0149 1,00 Utility 5,7715 5,7681 1,0038 gain
T pr. Index (pTi) 1,0209 1,0099 0,99 Hous exp. 4.219.348 4.169.841 Equivalent variation:
Real exch. r (rer) 0,9941 1,0050 1,01 Income (M) 4.219.348 4.169.841 1,0038 gain
Total Imp. (timp) 1.362.497 1.475.976 1,08 Total VAD 3.728.423 3.678.916
Total Exp.(texp) 1.088.236 1.109.941 1,02 Remittances 0 0
Tax transfers 207.816 207.816
Output base Output new New/Base ST ext. debt 283.109 283.109
SITC0+1 1.321.354 1.296.828 0,98
SITC2 23.667 23.595 1,00 Total Income 4.219.348 4.169.841
SITC3 498.538 488.188 0,98
SITC5 569.714 546.957 0,96 Trade Balance condition Imports (base) New New/Base
SITC6 269.515 262.440 0,97 -274.262 -366.035 1,33 SITC0&1 93.597 115.691 1,24
SITC7 488.111 482.549 0,99 SITC2 927 1.371 1,48
SITC8 438.311 422.053 0,96 Labor EmploymentLabor mkt. Clearing SITC3 164.826 171.519 1,04
Services 1.936.280 1.913.698 0,99 -99.506 -129.026 1,30 SITC5 270.455 286.543 1,06
Nontraded 2.262.422 2.240.368 0,99 SITC6 94.659 100.936 1,07
7.807.912 7.676.675 0,98 Capital utilizationCapital mkt. Clearing SITC7 304.374 307.016 1,01
-91.504 -111.492 1,22 SITC8 151.325 163.242 1,08
SERVICES 84.640 131.962 1,56
Geographic distribution of imports & domestic prod.
base CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic CEFTA EU FCP ROW Domestic 
SITC0+1 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,04 0,92 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,05 0,90
SITC2 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,92 0,02 0,04 0,02 0,03 0,88
SITC3 0,04 0,03 0,17 0,02 0,73 0,04 0,03 0,18 0,02 0,72
SITC5 0,03 0,26 0,01 0,11 0,59 0,03 0,27 0,02 0,12 0,56
SITC6 0,04 0,27 0,03 0,07 0,59 0,04 0,29 0,03 0,07 0,56
SITC7 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,30 0,02 0,47 0,03 0,19 0,28
SITC8 0,01 0,23 0,01 0,08 0,67 0,01 0,25 0,01 0,09 0,64
Services 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,94 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,91  
  
